A  Chilling  Effect? -- Geopolitical Incentivizing And The Environmental Ramifications For The Arctic Region by Harrison, Bryan J.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review
10-1-2009
A "Chilling" Effect? -- Geopolitical Incentivizing
And The Environmental Ramifications For The
Arctic Region
Bryan J. Harrison
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami
International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bryan J. Harrison, A "Chilling" Effect? -- Geopolitical Incentivizing And The Environmental Ramifications For The Arctic Region, 17 U.
Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 67 (2014)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol17/iss1/5
A "CHILLING" EFFECT? -
GEOPOLITICAL INCENTIVIZING AND THE
ENVIRONMENTAL RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE
ARCTIC REGION
Bryan J Harrison
I. Introduction ....................................... 67
II. Historical and Theoretical Context
for Recent Arctic Developments ............. 69
III. Lessons from Antarctica's Madrid
Protocol Applied to International
Arctic Policy ...................................... 76
IV. Current Geopolitics and the
Northwest Pasage ............................... 81
V. Future Implications ............................... 88
VI. Conclusion ......................................... 90
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a cold war of sorts being waged at the top of the
world. As a result of warmer temperatures, the Arctic ice caps are
melting, exposing vast quantifies of previously unreachable natural
resources and opening previously unreachable shipping routes in the
Northwest Passage.1 No fewer than eight countries have territory in
and political autonomy over areas in the Arctic region.2 Many of
Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Miami School of Law, 2010; B.A., History &
Political Science, University of Michigan. 2006.
1 Lee Clark, Canada's Oversight of Arctic Shipping: The Need for Reform, 33 TUL.
MAR. L.J. 79, 81-83 (2008). The Northwest Passage. for present purposes, "is the
body of Arctic water, including the waters adjacent to the Canadian coastline
between the Davis Straight and the Baffin Bay in the east and the Bering Strait in the
west." Id. at 83.; accord DONAT PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (R.J. Adie, et al. eds.. Cambridge Univ. Press) (1988).
2 See generally Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, June 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M.
1627 (referring to territory possessed by the United States. Russia, Canada, Denmark
(on behalf of Greenland), Iceland. Finland. Sweden. and Norway). Finland and
Sweden have territory in the zone, but no direct access to the Arctic Ocean.
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these countries have now begun vying, whether formally or
informally, for pieces of the Arctic and, in particular, the seabed
continental shelf found beneath the Arctic Ocean.3 Looming treaty
deadlines for formal review of territorial claims and rising environ-
mental costs against navigation and shipping through the Arctic have
complicated this struggle. What remains clear, however, is that "[the
issue] will not be decided by photo-ops or even by planting flags ....
It will be decided by geologists, lawyers and diplomats." 4 As one
commentator aptly notes, "[t]he plot is full of characters espousing
the rhetoric of cooperation yet pursuing their self-interests..." which
is transforming the Arctic "into a potential epicenter of world
affairs." 5
This paper seeks to address a small portion of the nexus
among environmental, legal, and geopolitical effects that such actors
espouse. Part II frames the discussion by providing an overview of
current geopolitical and environmental policies in the Arctic.
Analysis begins by positing the theory of the commons, and how
history has altered policies and prompted internationally recognized
practices. Emphasis is on the 'major' Arctic players' policies: namely
the United States, Canada, and Russia.
Part III considers the similarities between the Arctic and
Antarctica and then considers the need for Arctic law reform, draw-
ing parallels to the Antarctic Treaty regime, which prohibits further
national sovereignty assertions and actions in support of existing
assertions. The regime also defers natural resource extraction and
environmental degradation through efficient collaborative agree-
ments, emergency response, and binding dispute resolution mechan-
isms.
Part IV then analyzes the challenges faced by the United
States and Canada to reconcile competing interests concerning the
3 Press Release. Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf. Russ. Fed'n to Move to
Establish Outer Limits of Its Extended Cont'l Shelf. U.N. Doc. SEA/1729 (Dec. 21,
2001); Editorial, The Great Arctic Oil Rush, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007, at WK 9.
Moscow legislators navigated a small submersible vessel two miles under the polar
ice cap to place a Russian flag on the seabed. Id. Canada and the U.S. have both
dismissed the act. Id
4 The Great Arctic Oil Rush, supra note 3.
5 Scott G. Borgerson. The Great Game Moves North As the Arctic Melts, Countries
Vie for Control. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/64905/scott-g-borgerson/the-great-game-moves-north.
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Arctic. As shipping routes become more accessible, the potential for
international disputes increases. One such area of conflict is that of
shipping regulation through the Northwest Passage.
Finally, Part V concludes with an inquiry into the possible
impact that any competing state interests may have on the indigen-
ous communities in the Arctic.6
II. HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT
FOR RECENT ARCTIC DEVELOPMENTS
For the better part of history, the Arctic was treated as res
communis, global commons not belonging to any individual states. 7
For centuries, without a developed means of transport through the
Arctic's exceptionally harsh conditions and without the sophisticated
navigation technologies now available, the Arctic region was essent-
ially ignored. It was not until 1905 that Roald Amundsen made the
first recorded trip from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific by way of
the Arctic Ocean.8 Since then, fewer than two-hundred ships have
repeated the feat. 9 During this same time, a combination of factors -
including globalization, capitalism, and technological development -
spurred a policy shift from res communis to res nullis,1° transforming
the global commons into another paradigmatic example of the
"tragedy of the commons."1 1
6 For the purposes of the discussion, "state" will refer to an entity which has a
sovereign governing institution over a stable population within a defined territory.
This definition is consistent with that prescribed generally by international law
scholars. See, e.g.. 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 22 (2009).
7 See generally Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of
Mankind, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 109 (2009).
8 Cyrus C. Adams. Son of the Vikings Navigates the Northwest Passage. N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 1905, at SM3.
9 Arik Hesseldahl, Who Owns Rights to Melting Arctic. Bus. WK. ONLINE, Jan. 28,
2009,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jan2009/db20090127 95439
1.htm.
10 The principle of res nullis is one in which the land or entity is treated as belonging
to no one, therefore availing the opportunity for states to make territorial and
sovereignty claims over those areas. See Shackelford, supra note 7. at 115.
11 See Shackelford, supra note 7, at 115. The res communis model, also referred to as
the Grotius model, allows for shared navigation and resource extraction. See id at
122-23. Hugo Grotius published a 1609 treatise, later known as the Freedom of the
Seas Doctrine, which argued that the oceans constitute a common resource. Id.
2009
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With the advent of the submarine and off-shore drilling
techniques in the middle of the twentieth century, states discovered
and seized the extensive natural resources on the deep seabed floor,
hoping to reap the many strategic and economic benefits. 12 President
Harry Truman, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, asserted
that the United States had jurisdiction over all resources on its contin-
ental shelf.13 Other states quickly followed the United States' lead
and, in short time, customary international law arose recognizing the
validity of continental shelf claims.14 And so began Hardin's tragedy
of the commons for natural resource extraction and right-of-way
claims in the world's oceans.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS") seeks to reconcile sovereignty claims with res
communis.15 Drawing together prior treaties and customary internat-
ional law, UNCLOS establishes international property law erga
omnes, 16 providing coastal countries with extended, but limited juris-
diction of seabeds,17 while ensuring that the seabed and its mineral
resources beyond those jurisdictions remain in the "common heritage
(discussing HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH
BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE (Ralph Van
Deman Magoffin trans., Oxford University Press 1916) (1608)), see also Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243, 1243-48 (1968) (arguing that,
in the long term, communal resources become destroyed when persons act
independently in an environment with limited resources). Hardin metaphorically
uses a common land parcel for individual cow herders. He suggests that it is in the
best interest of each individual herder to put as many cows on the commons as
possible, maximizing the benefits of the land but minimizing the individual cost to
that herder. As all herders begin to make this decision individually, the commons
become depleted. Id. at 1244.
12 Shackelford, supra note 7, at 123.
13 Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (Sept. 28, 1945); Shackelford. supra
note 7, at 124. This assertion came a mere twenty six days after the Japanese
formally surrendered.
14 Penelope Warne. Arctic Scramble: International Law and the Continental Shelf.
ABERDEEN PRESS AND J., Oct. 1. 2007, at 24.
15 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 (Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
16 For present purposes. erga omnes is defined as an obligation owed by a state to the
international community as a whole. For a case discussing the principle of erga
omnes in this context, see, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5, 1970).
17 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 77.
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of mankind" that sustainably benefits all.18 While lauded as a
significant achievement in the field of international law, UNCLOS is
burdened by vagueness, financial shortcomings, bureaucratic
obstacles, and major non-adhering parties - most notably, the United
States .19
Scientific data suggests that the Arctic is warming and
melting icecaps at an unprecedented rate.20 Arctic sea ice coverage
has reduced from an average of seven million square kilometers
before the year 2000 to just over four million square kilometers in
2007.21 "Other signs - such as warmer deep-water ocean currents,
greater albedo feedback loops, and massive ice shelves breaking free
- point to further melting[,] ... [potentially] disgorg[ing] millions of
tons of methane, unleashing what some refer to as a 'climate bomb'..
• that could dramatically raise the planet's temperature." 22 In July
2008, a United States Geological Survey ("USGS") indicated that
areas "north of the Arctic Circle ha[ve] an estimated 90 billion barrels
of undiscovered, technically recoverable oil, [and] 1,670 trillion cubic
feet of technically recoverable natural gas," accounting for almost
one-quarter of the undiscovered, recoverable gas and oil resources in
the world.23 Even if these estimates prove high, it is clear that
previously inaccessible oil and gas reserves are now on the verge of
becoming accessible, raising new concerns and requiring new policies
by Arctic states.
A. The United States' Arctic Policy
18 Peter Prows, Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of UNCLOS
Property Law (And What is to be Done About It), 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 241, 244 (2007)
(suggesting that the "necessity of consensus for international property law can also
become an effective and constructive tool for encouraging countries to work together
on managing the implementation. development and proliferation of the law of the
sea").
19 Prows, supra note 18, at 241, 245.
20 See Borgerson, supra note 5.
21 Gerd Braune, Countries Seek Piece of Pie. SPIEGEL ONLINE, Mar. 23, 2009,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,614900,.00.html.
22 Borgerson, supra note 5.
23 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey. 90 Billion
Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic
(July 23, 2008), available at http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID = 1980.
2009
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While the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it has
engaged in its own extensive mapping and scientific data gathering
in the Arctic. In January 2009, President Bush signed a directive
laying the groundwork for the first revision of United States Arctic
policy since 1994. The directive was "expected to call on federal
agencies to better define the area of the Arctic seabed over which the
U.S. could lay claim" 24 and stated that the United States is "an Arctic
nation, with varied and compelling interests in that region." 25 These
varied interests include the United States' and Canada's sovereignty
over the Northwest Passage.26
To those ends, President Bush's directive directly challenges
the ambitious Canadian Arctic agenda by reiterating that the North-
west Passage is an international waterway and by claiming territory
in the Beaufort Sea.27 Furthermore, the directive indicates that "the
United States has broad and fundamental national security interests
in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently
or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests."28
While the Obama administration has yet to alter this
directive, the United States Department of the Interior Secretary, Ken
Salazar, has backed off other aggressive Bush Arctic plans, calling for
an additional six months of commenting period on Arctic drilling
proposals. 29 This shift is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's recent
ruling that the United States must further study and justify the
environmental impacts of drilling in wildlife and indigenous
communities before leased exploratory drilling can proceed in the
Beaufort Sea.30
24 Stephen Power, Bush Moves to Update U.S. Policy in Arctic Region, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 7, 2009, at B 1.
25 Presidential Directive on Arctic Region Policy, 45 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 47,
48 (Jan. 9, 2009).
26 See Doug Struck, Harper Tells U.S. to Drop Arctic Claim, WASH. POsT, Jan. 27,
2006, at A19; see also discussion infra Part IV(B).
27 Presidential Directive on Arctic Region Policy, supra note 25, at 48-49, 50.
28 Id at 48.
29 Andrew C. Revkin, Longer Comment Period on Energy Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 2009, at A17.
30 See Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2008)
(remanding so that Minerals Management Service can conduct the 'hard look'
analysis required by the National Environmental Policy Act with regards to the
Beaufort Sea region because the analysis utilized lacked specific information about
v. 17
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Thus, the United States faces many domestic regulatory and
policy hurdles before viably extracting natural resources from the
Arctic. Some have argued that the United States' inaction towards
asserting territorial claims is tantamount to "[falling] asleep at the
wheel." 31 It is imperative, given the strong domestic agendas of
Russia and other Arctic states, for "those in Washington to take
notice of the fast-changing politics on America's fifth coast." 32
B. Canadian Arctic Policy
Just as the United States must be cognizant of the geopolitical
issues, so too must Canada be swift and timely in ensuring that its
presence is preserved in the Arctic region. In addition to territorial
disputes with the United States over the seabed under the Beaufort
Sea and the Northwest Passage, Canada and Denmark dispute
ownership of Hans Island.3 3 These quarrels underlie the need for
Canada to articulate its national security interests in the Arctic.
The Canadian government is working to develop programs
mapping the Canadian Arctic in anticipation of international
boundary disputes, to facilitate shipbuilding projects for the Canad-
ian Navy and Coast Guard so as to ensure an active presence over the
Northwest Passage, and to fund environmental research projects on
the effects of climate change.3 4 Additionally, in 2008, "Canada
conducted its largest military exercise ever . . . block[ing] the sale of
Canadian radar technology to a U.S. buyer on national security
grounds." 35
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper has pledged his
government's commitment to defend Canadian sovereignty in the
future locations and did not address the impact on endangered bowhead whales and
Inupiat subsistence activities).
31 See Borgerson, supra note 5; see also Editorial. The Great Arctic Oil Rush. supra
note 3 ("We may never need a share of that oil, but it seems foolish not to keep it in
reserve.").
32 Borgerson, supra note 5.
33 George Kolisnek, Canadian Arctic Energy Security. ENSEC (Dec. 14, 2008).
http://www.ensec.org/index (search site for "George Kolisnek and select "Canadian
Arctic Energy Security). Hans Island is a small island between Greenland and
Canada's Ellesmere Island.
34 Id. Ironically. Canada is undertaking major hydrographical projects to map Arctic
coastlines and seabeds. Id.
35 Borgerson, supra note 5.
2009
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region, laying claims to expand Canadian territorial. 36 Harper has
also transferred an additional one-thousand soldiers to the Arctic
Ranger troops, and has invested more than $3 billion in new ice
breaker ships and a strategic naval patrol station at Nanisivik border-
ing the Northwest Passage.37
Another significant concern for Canada is the melting ice
cover in the Northwest Passage. Recently, both the United States 38
and the European Union ("EU") have alleged that the Passage, which
cuts through some 16,000 archipelago islands, constitutes internat-
ional waters. The EU Commission's Communication of November
2008 expresses the EU's intent "to explore and improve conditions for
gradually introducing Arctic commercial navigation" while promot-
ing "the principle of freedom of navigation and the right of innocent
passage in the newly opened routes and areas." 39 Such assertions
challenge Canada's jurisdictional claims that the Northwest Passage
is internal Canadian waters. Harper rejects any such contention,
claiming that "it is the Canadian people who [sic] we get our
mandate from, not [anyone else]. " 40
C. Russian Arctic Policy
Without a doubt, among the major countries involved, Russia
has been the most active in asserting territorial claims, developing
extensive military presence and infrastructure in the Arctic. The
significance of Russian policy is intensified given the inextricable
dependence that the EU has on Russia's state-owned oil conglom-
erate, Gazprom, to supply energy resources.41
Russia also has the benefit of a possible navigable route
through the Northern Sea Route, coined the Northeast Passage. In
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See discussion supra Part II(A).
39 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council The European Union and the arctic region. at 8, COM (2008) 763 final
(Nov. 20, 2008) [hereinafter "Commission Communication"].
40 See Struck, supra note 26.
41 See Andrew E. Kramer, Eastern Europe Fears New Era of Russian Sway, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2009, at Al. Gazprom supplies Europe with roughly twenty-eight
percent of its natural gas. Russia's ambitious plan to run a pipeline along the bed of
the Baltic Sea has been met with criticisms as such leverage is utilizing natural gas
as a way to play "pipeline politics." Id. at A12.
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fact, Russia hopes that the melting ice and luring economic benefits
will make its passage a summer competitor with the Suez Canal.42
Russia is hoping to promote the route and collect fees by charging for
icebreaker escorts, navigation convoys, and permits for ships.43
Russia created an international frenzy with its 2007 flag planting on
the North Pole seabed and its pronouncement that the Arctic "has
always been Russian and remains Russian today" 44 and "must
become Russia's main strategic base for raw materials[," the battle
for which will "be waged with military means."45
Additionally, in 2008, Russia sent strategic bomber flights to
the borders of American, Canadian, Norwegian and Danish air-
spaces, coupled with regular patrols of Arctic waters by the Russian
navy.46 Moscow has committed over a billion dollars to double the
capacity of its northern port of Murmansk.47 The government has
plans to expand its nuclear icebreaker fleet, to build the world's first
floating nuclear power plant, and to have Gazprom extracting the
first Arctic gas by 2013.48
It is clear that the major Arctic nations, though purportedly
willing to enter into cooperative diplomatic agreements, are not
deterred from embarking on their own extensive research and
military and political maneuvering. If an amicable solution is to be
reached, it appears the interested states will have to look beyond
UNCLOS.
42 Andrew E. Kramer & Andrew C. Revkin, Arctic Shortcut, Long a Dream, Beckons
Shippers as Ice Thaws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, at Al. "The passage of [] two
German ships appears to be the first true commercial transit of the entire Northeast
Passage from Asia to the West." Id. Such a passage through the route north of Russia
would reduce the voyage from Japan to Rotterdam by about 4,450 miles. Id. at A3
43 Id. at A3.
44 Spiegel Staff, The Last Gold Rush: Coastal Nations Grab for Ocean Floor Riches,
SPIEGEL ONLINE, June 4, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
0,1518,557487,00.html.
45 Matthias Schepp & Gerald Traufetter, Riches at the North Pole: Russia Unveils
Aggressive Arctic Plans, Spiegel Online, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/
international/world/0,1518,604338,.00.html. Russian parliament member and the
operator who planted the Russian flag on the ocean floor, Artur Chilingarov,
claimed: "We are not prepared to give our Arctic to anyone [and] if these rights are
not recognized. Russia will withdraw from [UNCLOS]." Id.
46 Borgerson, supra note 5.
47 Id.
48 Id.
2009
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III. LESSONS FROM ANTARCTICA'S MADRID
PROTOCOL APPLIED TO INTERNATIONAL ARCTIC
POLICY
A. Comparative View of the Arctic and Antarctica
Logically, given some of the apparent similarities between
Antarctica and the Arctic, and given the treaty successes in minimiz-
ing natural resource and sovereignty disputes over the South Pole, a
question arises as to why a similar counterpart has not yet been
developed for the Arctic.
Both the Arctic and Antarctica are rich in natural resources
and wildlife. Both are cold-climate polar regions. Yet, there are sign-
ificant differences between the two. Antarctica is managed as a global
commons area and is a continent, unlike the Arctic. There is water,
not land, found beneath the Arctic's ice, and the area falls almost
entirely under the sovereignty of one of the eight nations' territories
that extend into the Arctic Circle.49 And perhaps most significantly,
the Arctic contains numerous indigenous communities, unlike Antar-
ctica where there are no true indigenous peoples.50 As a result of
these differences, efforts to protect the Arctic are guided mainly by
national law; cooperative efforts are considered merely 'soft law,'
which do not possess the strict characteristics of recognized enforce-
ability and are non-binding, though they may evolve into binding
customary law.51
However different the two regions may appear to be, it is
prudent to consider the possibility of adopting similar governing
regulations. It is even more prudent, given the success of the Ant-
arctic Treaty and the 1991 Madrid Protocol thereto (collectively, the
Antarctic Treaty System or "ATS"), to thwart international geopol-
itics and environmental degradation. 52 The heightening of the Cold
49 DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1152
(2006).
50 Id. at 1153; see discussion infra Part V.
51 See discussion infra Ill(A). UNCLOS, however, does provide hard law for those
states party to it. e.g., control of exclusive economic zones, protection of the marine
environment, etc. See generally UNCLOS. supra note 15, arts. 55-75, 145.
52 See Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (June 23,
1961); Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties: Final Act of the Eleventh Antarctic
Special Consultative Meeting and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty. Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455 [hereinafter Madrid Protocol]. The
Madrid Protocol was the most significant amendment of the Antarctic Treaties.
v. 17
A "CHILLING" EFFECT
War and the growing presence of both the Soviet Union and the
United States in Antarctica made it imperative to develop an internat-
ional agreement. The year 1959 marked the International Geophysical
Year in Antarctica, and the successful cooperation of the twelve
nations allowed ATS to address all of the major issues confronting
Antarctica at that time. 53
The objective of UNCLOS mirrors that of ATS, which
commits its parties to the "comprehensive protection of the Antarctic
environment and dependent and associated ecosystems and . . .
[which] designates Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace
and science." 54 ATS' scope is far reaching: all activities are mandated
to protect the Antarctic environment.55 This prohibition extends to
"any activity relating to mineral resources" 56 and also to any "acts or
activities . . . [that] constitute a basis for assenting, supporting, or
denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any
rights of sovereignty in Antarctica." 57 ATS specifically prohibits the
assertion of any new territorial claims, including those pertaining to
the enlargement of an existing claim.58 Commentators have noted the
reconciliation of sovereignty claims to be the "cornerstone of the
Antarctic Treaty." 59 Poignantly, both natural resource exploitation
and sovereign territorial claims in the Arctic are contentious issues
that remain generally unresolved under UNCLOS.
From a practical standpoint, Article 76 of UNCLOS contains
numerous procedural mechanisms for the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea and the International Seabed Authority to deter-
Among other things. the Protocol requires a 50 year moratorium on exploitation of
mineral resources. Id. at art. 7.
53 Donald R. Rothwell, The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute: A
Reassessment, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 331, 364 (1993). Incidentally enough, 2007
2009 again signals an International Polar Year.
54 Madrid Protocol, supra note 52, art. 2.
55 Id. at art. 3(1).
56 Id. at art. 7.
57 Antarctic Treaty. supra note 52, art. 4(2).
58 Id.
59 See Rothwell, supra note 53, at 365 (quoting Rolph Trolle-Anderson, The
Antarctic Scene: Legal and Political Facts, THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME: LAW,
ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES 57, 59 (Gillian D. Triggs ed.. 1987)). This
cornerstone is also especially pertinent when seeking to resolve the Canadian-United
States dispute over the Northwest Passage. See discussion infra Part IV.
2009
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mine and analyze disputing claims for expanded territories.
However, these mechanisms are largely ineffective, whereas ATS
contains numerous practical and effective articles requiring collabor-
ative planning of activities in the region, 60 emergency response
plans, 61 and dispute resolution procedures. 62 Together, these are
critical areas of development in the Arctic.
B. Collaborative Planning
There are numerous UNCLOS articles encouraging internat-
ional cooperation among parties to develop and publicly disseminate
information. 63 However, these articles are vaguely constructed for
particular sections. Simply considering Canada and Russia, 64 it is
clear that these countries are conducting research, mapping the
Arctic seabed, extracting soil samples, and developing policy on a
national level without multinational cooperation. In marked contrast,
Antarctic research is done through multinational research organiza-
tions and international agreements. 65 Given the potential for signific-
ant financial profiteering and natural resource exploitation in the
Arctic, the ability of a country to freely expand seabed claims under
Article 76 is dangerous in the tragedy of the commons context.
Collaborative efforts are needed to discourage secretive domestic
information-gathering and economic incentivizing.
C. Emergency Response Mechanisms
60 Madrid Protocol, supra note 52, art. 6(1) ("The Parties shall co-operate in the
planning and conduct of activities in the Antarctic Treaty."); Antarctic Treaty, supra
note 52, art. 6(2) (requiring that each party "share information that may be helpful to
other Parties in planning and conducting their activities in the area, with a view to
the protection of the environment and dependent ecosystems").
61 Madrid Protocol, supra note 52, art. 15 ("[T]he Parties shall establish procedures
for immediate notification of, and co-operative response to, environmental
emergencies.").
62 Id. at art. 18 ("If a dispute arises ... the parties to the dispute shall, consult among
themselves as soon as possible with a view to having the dispute resolved by
negotiation. inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other
peaceful means."); see also id at arts. 19, 20.
63 E.g., UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts. 197, 242, 244.
64 See discussion supra Part II(B) and Part II(C).
65 See Antarctic Treaty. supra note 52, art. 3; Madrid Protocol. supra note 52, art. 6.
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As the Arctic becomes more accessible, one major concern is the
lack of an effective emergency response program for maritime or
mining disasters. The risk of a catastrophic spill is significant; the
United States Minerals Management System ("MMS") predicts at
least one major oil spill in the first fifteen years, in just the Beaufort
and Chukchi seas. 66 While UNCLOS seeks to impose various duties
on parties, such as to render assistance on the high seas, 67 to permit
travel through sovereign passages, 68 to travel such passages with due
care, 69 and to respect exclusive economic zones,70 UNCLOS does not
mandate an explicit duty to assist in the formulation and execution of
an emergency response program. This is especially troublesome in
the Arctic, given the "dearth of experience with producing oil in
waters exposed to seasonal ice pack and the acknowledged inability
to respond to or clean up any oil releases in the presence of ice," 71
which makes a major release of oil likely to be catastrophic.
Such a response mechanism is in place in the ATS. Article 15
of the Madrid Protocol mandates that each party "provide for prompt
and effective response action to such emergencies which might
arise" 72 and to "establish contingency plans for response to incidents
with potential adverse effects on the Antarctic environment." 73
Furthermore, parties must cooperate in the formulation and implem-
entation of contingency plans and establish an intricate notification
and response system to any emergencies. 74 What is particularly
relevant for Arctic considerations is that an emergency response
mechanism exists in Antarctica, where sovereignty claims and
natural resource extraction are prohibited. Such a response plan for
66 Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf and the Future of Our
Oceans: Joint Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral
Resources and Subcomm. on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife of the H. Comm.
on Natural Resources, 11 1th Cong. 84 (2009) (statement of Jeffeiy Short, Ph.D.,
Pacific Science Director, Oceana) [hereinafter "Energy Development on Ocean
Testimony"].
67 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 98.
68 Id at art. 44.
69 Id. at art. 3 9.
70 Id. at art. 58.
71 Energy Development on Oceans Testimony, supra note 66, at 84.
72 Madrid Protocol, supra note 52, art. 15(1)(a).
73 Id. at art. 15(1)(b).
74 Id. at art. 15(2).
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the Arctic would assuage some of the opponents of resource
exploration and also necessarily foster collaborative discussion
among the Arctic countries. 75
D. Dispute Resolution Procedures
Article 279 of UNCLOS urges the parties to "settle any
dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of
this Convention by peaceful means .... "76 If the parties cannot reach
an agreement within a "reasonable period of time," remedial provi-
sions of UNCLOS are invoked. 77 And even if agreement is reached,
countries can opt out of binding dispute resolution provisions.78 To
date, Norway has been the only country to submit itself to the
binding dispute resolution clauses of UNCLOS. 79
In contrast, under ATS, there is a binding system of dispute
resolution. If collaborative dispute resolution fails, ATS requires
resolution either through a submission to the International Court of
Justice or the Arbitral Tribunal.8 0 Given the nature of the disputes in
the Arctic, a binding requirement may be a necessary component of
any future international legal agreements between Arctic nations.
With a binding dispute resolution system, countries cannot shun out-
comes they deem to be disadvantageous to their national interests
without consequence.81 Binding dispute resolution also fosters a
75 Environmental advocacy groups often cite the Exxon Valdez disaster, recently
marked by its 20th anniversary, as proof of the possible dangers that exist in the
Arctic. By conservative estimates, cleanup and recovery cost $2 billion and Exxon
has paid at least $1 billion in damages. The incident illustrates the inherent and
unavoidable risks of drilling and shipping through the Arctic: ice, turbulent waters,
ecological damage, outdated navigational maps. and shallow channel systems.
Editorial, Lessons of the Exxon Valdec. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, at A20.
76 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 279.
77 Id. at art. 83.
78 Id. at art. 298.
79 Stephanie Holmes, Comment, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic
Sovereignty, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 323, 340 (2008).
80 Antarctic Treaty. supra note 52, art. 19(1). Also, under Art. 20(1), if a year has
passed without resolution, the dispute shall be referred in accordance with Art.
19(5), which provides that if parties to a dispute have not accepted means for
settlement of a dispute, the dispute may be submitted only to the Arbitral Tribunal.
81 It seems this is the route to which Russia has committed itself with regards to their
recent territorial claims, vowing to leave UNCLOS if their territorial requests are not
met. See discussion supra Part II(C). Whether binding resolution would resolve such
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sense of international legitimacy that may be absent in non-binding
processes.
IV. CURRENT GEOPOLITICS AND THE
NORTHWEST PASSAGE
The Northwest Passage ("Passage") consists of "the marine
routes between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans along the northern
coast of North America that open the straits and sounds of the
Canadian Arctic Archipelago." 82 The allure of such a course is a
significantly shorter and faster route: a 12,400 mile voyage from
Japan to England is cut to less than 8,700 miles and saves two weeks
of the travel time.83 There is an even greater incentive today, as the
current struggle for natural resources incentivizes the extraction and
shipping directly from the Arctic region.
A. The Dispute in Territorial and Environmental Terms
With the receding ice caps, there are fewer navigational
problems for vessels, and little doubt that such a route would hold
great utility for industry. However, Canada has long attempted to
assert that the Passage lies within its internal waters, thereby giving
Canada the ability to set the parameters and means by which vessels
can travel through the Passage. The United States has consistently
maintained that the Passage is international waters, open to the
freedom of navigation principle, and thus free from regulatory
control by any particular state.
Canada claims sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago,
insisting that the waterways are internal. Canada's claims are based
on historical tradition; throughout the course of history, Canadian
explorers regularly explored and traveled the straits. 84 During the
twentieth century, Canada regularly asserted that the waters were
Canadian and were "internal waters of Canada subject to Canadian
unilateral demands is unclear; however, the binding nature would likely lend itself to
greater credibility.
82 Christopher Mark Macneill. Gaining Command & Control of the Northwest
Passage: Strait Talk on Sovereignty, 34 TRANSP. L.J. 355, 368 (2007).
83 See Hesseldahl, supra note 9.
84 See Rothwell, supra note 53, at 334. These claims are disputed because they were
not always accompanied by the raising of the sponsoring sovereign flag. Id. The
Canadian claim is also based in various treaties, including the Treaty of Paris. Id.
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control and regulation for safety and environmental purposes."85
Throughout all of this, the United States has maintained that the
Passage is an international strait not subject to Canadian control.86
The United States has been careful, however, not to dispute the
Canadian territorial claims to the archipelago islands, but rather, only
to dispute the claims to the waterway itself.87 Thus, as framed, the
debate between the United States and Canada rests on whether the
water among the archipelago islands is international or internal.88
In 2008, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper bolstered
sovereignty claims by announcing that all ships transiting Canadian
waters would be required to register with Canada's maritime traffic
system.89 Under this policy, Canada directed its Coast Guard to
intercept vessels that fail to comply with reporting requirements and
doubled the size of the regulatory zone in which the state can
prohibit the deposit of waste from land or ship under domestic law.90
85 Id. at 342 (quoting Canadian Practice in International Law during 1980 as
Reflected Mainly in Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department of
External Affairs, 19 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 320, 322 (comp. L. H. Legault 1981).
Controversy arose in 1985 when the United States sailed the icebreaker Polar Sea
through the Passage without seeking official Canadian permission. Id. at 343.
Following the voyage, Canada reasserted its right of sovereignty over the waters of
the passage. Id. at 344. Canada also declared that "[t]he policy of the Government is
to exercise full sovereignty in and on the waters of the Arctic Archipelago .... We
will accept no substitute." Id at 344 (quoting Canada. House of Commons, Debates,
Vol. 5. at 6463 (Sept. 10, 1985)).
86 Id. at 347.
87 Id. at 360.
88 One scholar aptly analogizes transit through the Passage to "hikers in the United
Kingdom who can walk across country estates even though the aristocrat owns the
land[;] the hikers have a right to transit over his property." Interview by Kai
Ryssdale with Michael Byers. Professor of International Politics, University of
British Columbia,
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/features/frozenassets/frozenassets ryssdal byers.
html (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
89 Michael A. Becker, Public International Law of the Sea, 43 INT'L LAW 915, 920
(2009).
90 Id. Additionally. this would potentially violate the right of transit through
international straits guaranteed by UNCLOS. Id. at n.33. However, bordering states
are allowed to prescribe traffic separation schemes where necessary to promote the
safe passage of ships. Id. at n.33 (citing UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 38).
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UNCLOS provides that in archipelagic waters, there is a right
of innocent, free passage.91 Further, UNCLOS delineates the archip-
elagic baselines in determining what is, or is not, an archipelago for
sovereignty and international transit distinctions.92
Part of the problem lies in defining whether the Northwest
Passage falls within customarily recognized international law para-
meters. Following the Corfu Channel Case,93 there are two primary
determinations: 1) that the strait connect two parts of the high seas
(geographic), and 2) that the strait be used for international
navigation (function).94 Some scholars suggest that the Passage is
consistent with the geographic requirement because the Passage
connects two areas of high seas and exclusive economic zones. 95 With
91 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 52(1).
92 See id at art. 47. In relevant part:
1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines
joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying
reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are
included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the
area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is
between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.
2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical
miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length. up to a
maximum length of 125 nautical miles.
3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any apprec-
iable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
4. Such baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide
elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are
permanently above sea level have been built on them or where a
low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not
exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the nearest island.
5. The system of such baselines shall not be applied by an archip-
elagic State in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas or
the exclusive economic zone the territorial sea of another State.
6. If a part of the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State lies
between two parts of an immediately adjacent neighbouring State,
existing rights and all other legitimate interests which the latter
State has traditionally exercised in such waters and all rights
stipulated by agreement between those States shall continue and
be respected. Id.
93 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 28 (Apr. 9, 1949).
94 Id.
95 See Rothwell, supra note 53, at 353-54.
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regards to the function requirement, there has been "continuing
emphasis ... that ... the strait through which the right of passage is
being claimed be used for 'international navigation."' 96 The Corfi
Channel Court was careful to emphasize that demonstrating potential
use of a strait is not alone sufficient - actual use must be demon-
strated. 97 Because UNCLOS lacks a sufficiently clear definition of the
functional requirement, it can be argued that deference to Corfi
should still apply, thereby requiring evidence proving that the strait
is actually being used for relevant international navigation. 98 With
the looming extraction of deep-sea resources, there is a strong
likelihood that routes through the Passage will be more commonly
utilized, thus opening the door to additional justifications for
relevant international navigation.
There are also competing international interests in the
Passage dispute between the European Union (EU) and Russia. The
European Union's position is to recognize that the Passage is an inter-
national strait.99 This is not surprising given the economic interest of
EU member states in using the Passage for transport.100 To the
contrary, and expectedly, Russia has supported Canada's position
that Canada has complete control over the territory.101 Naturally,
Russia's position supporting Canadian claims seems a calculated
attempt at further legitimizing its claim to sovereignty over the
Northeast Passage, where commercial shipping is already prevalent,
and where Russia closely monitors and taxes vessels.10 2
One of the central reasons Canada asserts control of the
Passage is so it can provide stricter oversight and pollution controls
permitted under Article 234 of UNCLOS and through Canadian
maritime law.10 3 Regular shipping through the Passage would both
96 Id.
97 See Tommy B. Koh, The Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Straits and
Archipelagoes under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 29 MALAYA L.
REV. 163,178 (1987).
98 See, Rothwell, supra note 53. at 355 (citation omitted).
99 Macneill, supra note 82, at 366.
100 See id
101 See id (citations omitted).
102 See Kramer & Revkin, supra note 42, at Al. A2.
103 See discussion infra Part IV(B). Recent collaborative efforts between the United
States and Canada establishing emissions control areas is a significant building block
towards resolving additional environmental and territorial disputes.
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interfere with the rate of ice formation and breakup, and pose
significant health risks to mammals. 104 Stricter Canadian regulation
would mitigate these dangers. Another environmental concern is the
significant harm that accidental pollution, such as an oil spill, could
cause on the Arctic's low regenerative capacity. 105 If Canada exercises
such control, Article 234 of UNCLOS would permit it to "adopt and
enforce [its own] non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the
prevention, reduction, and control of marine pollution from vessels..
• within the limits of the exclusive economic zone." 106 Given the
heightened environmental recognitions of the Canadian government
and its citizenry, these proposed policies would likely provide strong
environmental protections and minimize environmental risks and
shipping dangers.
Canada regulates shipping in its Arctic waters primarily
through its domestic Arctic Waters Pollution Act ("AWPPA"),10 7
which prohibits the deposit of waste in the state's arctic waters. 108
The regulation also requires ships to have prescribed navigational, 10 9
inspection,110 and construction standards.11 Violations of AWPPA
are punishable by civil liability. 112 Problems are likely to arise when
Canada seeks to assert sovereign ownership, either through AWPPA
or under UNCLOS, when there is a dispute over the Passage's proper
classification.
For the Northwest Passage, the distinction between actual and
potential transport may be the decisive issue that resolves the debate.
While the receding ice has raised the possibility of extensive utiliza-
104 See D.M. McRae & D.J. Goundrey, Environmental Jurisdiction in Arctic Waters:
The Extent of Article 234. 16 U.B.C. L. REV. 197, 200 (1982).
10' Id at 201 (citation omitted); see also Clark. supra note 1, at 84-85 (citation
omitted). Clark's insistence for Canada to implement stricter emissions regulations
for transport in coastal areas under a new national regulatory scheme, while
appropriate at the time, may now be mooted by the agreement reached in
cooperation with the United States. See also discussion infra Part IV(B).
106 See UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 234.
107 See Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act [hereinafter "AWPPA"],. R.S.C., ch.
A-12 (1985). The legislation was designed to address deficiencies in marine
pollution protection in international law.
108 Id. at arts. 6, 18-19.
109 Id. at art. 12.
110 Id. at art. 15.
111 Id. at arts. 10, 12, 19.
112 Id. at arts. 6. 18-19, 23-25.
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tion of the Passage for shipping, expectations are that summer ship-
ing routes will remain accessible for a period of only four to six
weeks. 113 The Canadian efforts to assert sovereignty over the waters
in the Passage and the United States' insistence that the Passage is
international has the two at an impasse. It is critical for the United
States and Canada to amicably resolve the Passage dispute.
B. Possible Resolutions and Implications Applying Antarctic Treaty
Considerations
Given the similarities between the Arctic and Antarctica,
commentators suggest that an Antarctic Treaty-type solution is
appropriate for the Arctic, as it would "allow the sovereignty issue to
be resolved in favour of the existing sovereign, Canada, while
permitting international navigation in the Passage without affecting
the status of that sovereign."1 14 Furthermore, such a solution would
allow the United States to use the Passage without requiring permis-
sion from Canada or otherwise implicitly acknowledging the
Canadian claims to sovereignty of the Passage itself.115 The incorp-
oration of ATS provisions may also facilitate the interests of both
Canada and the United States. For the United States, UNCLOS
expressly provides for the uninhibited right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea1 16 and further prohibits the "impos[ition]
of requirements on foreign ships which have the practical effect of
denying or impairing the right of innocent passage."1 17 For Canada,
Article 234 allows the coastal state to "adopt and enforce non-
113 Macneill, supra note 82, at 360.
114 Rothwell, supra note 53, at 368; see discussion supra Part Il1(A). Such a
resolution necessarily involves the cessation of any claims of sovereignty or natural
resource extraction. Both of these concerns were quashed in the Antarctic with the
Antarctic Treaty System beginning in 1959. Id.
115 Id. at 369. An increasingly accessible Northwest Passage would also spur the
increase in tourist and commercial cruise ships using the waters. Tourism and eco-
tourism are already two significant concerns for environmentalists in the waters off
Alaska. Pollution levels have risen as the amount of tourist vessels frequenting these
waters has increased. See generally Mary E. Edes, Ecotourism in the Arctic Circle:
Regional Regulation is Necessary to Prevent Concerned Environmentalists from
Further Contributing to Climate Change, 21 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV.
L.J. 251 (2008).
116 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 17.
117 Id. at art. 24(1)(a).
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discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction
and control of marine pollution vessels in ice-covered areas."1 18
Through such discussions, a workable solution may arise
providing Canada with ample jurisdiction to enforce environmental
and emissions standards for transit through the waters, and provid-
ing the United States (and other states) the guarantee of free naviga-
tion. Resolving the dispute increases multilateral policy-making,
especially in terms of environmental and security concerns, and can
help to "promote bilateral and multilateral Arctic cooperation" in
other areas as well.119 One difficulty is recognizing the validity of
interpretations made by Canada under UNCLOS and how these
obligations will shape the United States' discussions, especially if the
United States remains a non-party to UNCLOS.
In a significant collaborative effort in March 2009, the United
States and Canada submitted a joint request to the International
Maritime Organization that would require emissions control areas in
and around their collective coasts. 120 The restrictions would require
large ships to use "low-sulfur fuel or new technology to ensure that
they emit less sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and soot."121 Ships
would be required to use fuel with no more than 1,000 parts per
million of sulfur beginning in 2015, and beginning in 2016, new ships
would be required to use advanced pollution controls. 122 Further,
"compared with current rules, the restrictions, which could be
approved as early as next year, would cut allowable levels of sulfur
in fuel by 98 percent, soot by 85 percent and nitrogen oxide pollution
by 80 percent from current rules."1 23
Ships are currently burning fuel 1,800 times dirtier (in terms
of high sulfur concentration) than diesel trucks.124 Also, the emission
control area would achieve a sulfur reduction to 0.1 percent - a
118 Id. at art. 234.
119 See Rothwell, supra note 53, at 372.
120 See Juliet Eilperin. US., Canada Propose Pollution Control Zones for Ports,
WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2009, at A2.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 U.S. and Canada Seek International Approval of Air Pollution Reduction Zone
for Ships. Mar. 30, 2009, http://www.foe.org/us-and-canada-seek-international-
approval-air-pollution-reduction-zone-ships [hereinafter "U.S. and Canada Seek
International Approval"].
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marked improvement, though still 66 times dirtier than ultra low
diesel.1 25 Additionally, a study by the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration indicates that merchant ships alone are
responsible for emitting as much pollution as three hundred million
cars.1 26 Sulfur emissions are a major contributor to particulate matter
pollutants (which create carcinogenic and other health risks to
humans and wildlife), and, moreover, they accelerate the melting of
Arctic ice, thereby exposing fragile ecosystems to shipping routes and
natural resource extraction.1 27
This collaborative effort is a notable step forward and may
provide an impetus for future discussions regarding the Passage.
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
One of the most often ignored implications of expanding
Arctic resource extraction and transport is the incontrovertible result
that such processes are having on the environment and the indigen-
ous communities. Much of the discussion focuses on the legitimacy of
claims or the historical assertions of traditional spatial use, but rarely
is the focus on the development of collective efforts to protect the
indigenous populations.
Moving forward, assessing the impact on the Arctic's
indigenous communities must be a priority. Significantly, unlike
Antarctica, the Arctic is home to numerous indigenous populations,
whose very existence and normative structures are dictated by the
125 Id.; see also UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGULAT-
ORY ANNOUNCEMENT: PROPOSAL OF EMISSION CONTROL AREA DESIGNATION FOR
GEOGRAPHIC CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS, (Mar. 2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/420fO9015.htm. A study by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration found that globally, ships emit
0.9 teragrams. or about 2.2 million pounds, of particle pollution each year. Chemical
Sciences Division, Earth System Research Laboratory, NOAA, Study Quantifies
Pollutant Emissions from Ships (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/csd/news/
hotitemFY09.html [hereinafter NOAA]. Emission Control Area standards will lead
to an 86 percent reduction in sulfur in ships' fuels, as well as a cut in emissions of
particulate matter by 74 percent and nitrous oxide by 23 percent. UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra.
126 NOAA, supra note 125.
127 See Elizabeth Shogren. EPA Unveils New Ports Emissions Plan (National Public
Radio Broadcast Mar. 30, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId = 102524660.
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Arctic environment. The European Union's recent Communication
epitomizes the majority view towards indigenous groups. Though it
recognizes the need "[to] engage Arctic indigenous peoples in a
regular dialogue, [to] provide opportunities for self-driven develop-
ment and [for] the protection of their lifestyle,"1 28 in the end, it denies
the indigenous groups any real bargaining power.
While organizations like the Arctic Council129 have worked to
address such shortcomings, commentators have noted the difficulty -
under current policies - of the continued viability of the indigenous
populations. 130 The Arctic Council's "inadequate membership and
inability to completely fight and prevent pollution" precludes the
organization from providing effective protection of the Arctic
environment and its peoples. 131 Harmonization of the fragmented
regime of multilateral and bilateral accords would assist in augment-
ing the Arctic Council's efficacy, as would financing of an Arctic fund
for researching, monitoring, preserving indigenous lands, and most
significantly, executing environmental regulation.
Further complicating international cooperation is the fact that
some indigenous groups are in favor of Arctic expansion, viewing the
prospect of increased commercial activity to be economically favor-
able. 132 Thus, any further discussions must include substantive
considerations for the protection of these groups. One possible reso-
lution for indigenous communities would be the creation of a "func-
tional multilateral regime guaranteeing tribal sovereignty over
indigenous tracts of Arctic tundra [and] pledges of binding multi-
128 Commission Communication, supra note 39, at § 2.2.
129 An intergovernmental forum encouraging cooperation among Arctic states and
indigenous communities. Sophie Theriault. Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland:
Inuit People's Food Security in the Age of Climate Change and Arctic Melting, 15
Sw. J. INT'L L. 223, 247 n.110 (2009).
130 See id at 224. One of the often overlooked problems is the devastating effect the
changing Arctic environment has on the indigenous peoples. See id at 231, 233-34.
131 Barry Hart Dubner, On the Basis for Creation of a New Method of Defining
International Jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean, 13 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 18
(2005) (also arguing that it is imperative for states to give up certain sovereignty in
order to protect the Arctic region).
132 See Andrew C. Revkin, Countries Agree to Talk, Not Compete, Over the Arctic,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2008, at A10. However, many Inuits strongly oppose any
expansion due to the likely threat posed to their traditions and their use of natural
resources for subsistence. See id.
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lateral cooperation." 133 The viability and protection of indigenous
groups has been merely an afterthought to many of the countries
involved in the sovereignty struggle.
VI. CONCLUSION
Taken collectively, there are major international apprehen-
sions over the current race for the Arctic seabed. It has been coined
"the last great land grab." 134 As the Arctic becomes more accessible,
economic incentives have subsumed cooperative agreements and
environmental initiatives. Finding a compromise between energy
exploitation and environmental protection is the paramount priority.
Without clear environmental protection and regulations over re-
source extraction and shipping, the negative effects of climate change
will only be aggravated. The future of a protected Arctic - and the
extent to which international collaboration will play a role in shaping
Arctic policy - rests upon the willingness of the Arctic states to
develop a multilateral agreement that recognizes both sovereign
rights and the need for strict environmental regulations and the
protection of indigenous populations.
The year 2009 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the
International Polar Year, a year in which an elaborate and successful
agreement was reached to protect Antarctica. With the constant
dialogues involving climate change and energy independence, now is
a symbolic and the opportune time to reexamine domestic and inter-
national policies governing the Arctic.
133 See Shackelford, supra note 7. at 140.
134 Rothwell, supra note 53.
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